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COMMENTARIES: AMENDMENT AND PATRIATION
In the following commentaries, Peter W. Hogg and W. R. Lederman discuss different
aspects of Geoffrey Marshall's presentation on amendment and patriation.Professor
Hogg's topic is more specifically the role of the United Kingdom Parliament, while Professor Lederman comments upon the positions of the Supreme Court of Canadaand the
British Government and Parliament.
PETER W. HOGG*

This comment deals with the role of the United Kingdom Parliament,
which is Professor Marshall's third topic. I should say at the outset that I am
an adherent of the "no sniffing at the package" theory.
We should start with a proposition that we can probably all agree on,
although it has been denied rather frequently. It is that the United Kingdom
Parliament cannot take any initiative with respect to Canada. That is to say
the United Kingdom cannot do anything that has not been requested by
Canada, because there is a convention that the United Kingdom Parliament
will not legislate for Canada except at the request and with the consent of
Canada. That convention applies to the amendment of the British North
America Act even though the Statute of Westminster does not apply to the
amendment of the British North America Act. Now that convention precludes a lot of the suggestions which have been made, both in Canada and the
United Kingdom, for resolution of the present crisis. For example, the
United Kingdom cannot simply repeal section 7 of the Statute of Westminster. The United Kingdom cannot sever the Bill of Rights and pass the rest of
the package. The United Kingdom cannot do any of those things because
Canada has not requested them. Any unrequested initiative would be
entirely contrary to the principle of Canadian independence.
We therefore arrive at the proposition that the United Kingdom Parliament's options come down to three things. Its first choice is to comply with
the request which has been made by the federal government in precisely the
terms in which it has been requested. A second option is to refuse the
request, and a third is to delay in dealing with the request. There are no other
choices open to the United Kingdom Parliament.
My comments deal with each of those three choices, and firstly with the
possibility that the United Kingdom Parliament might refuse the request. In
my view, that is not a proper course for the United Kingdom Parliament to
follow. To refuse the request that will be made in the form of a joint address
of the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada is for the United Kingdom Parliament to presume to decide who speaks for Canada. That decision,
in my view, involves an unacceptable interference by the United Kingdom in
Canada's internal affairs. Consider what it entails. It would involve the
United Kingdom Parliament entering into an inquiry as to whether there is a
convention in Canada binding the federal government to secure the consent
of the provinces before requesting an amendment which would affect the
powers of the provinces. That is an inquiry that the Kershaw Committee
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embarked upon. As Professor Marshall said, they found it possible to reach
their conclusions without consulting any Canadian constitutional lawyers. If
they had consulted Canadian constitutional lawyers and Canadian political
scientists, they would have found that opinion within Canada was quite
mixed.
About a year ago I tried to survey all the sources of statements as to
whether there was or was not a convention requiring provincial consent. To
give you some idea of the kind of difference of opinion that does exist, let me
provide some illustrations. Professor Lederman has consistently argued that
there is a convention. Dr. Gerin-Lajoie, the author of the major study on the
amendment of the Canadian constitution1 agrees, saying there is such a
convention. The 1965 White Paper is also offered as evidence of the
existence of a convention. However, I do not find the White Paper at all conclusive. The White Paper enunciates four famous principles, but makes it
clear that they are "not constitutionally binding" in any strict sense. It is not
entirely clear whether the authors intended to enunciate a convention. I
think that it is likely that the White Paper demonstrates no such intention.
In any event, Professor Lederman and Dr. Gerin-Lajoie, and possibly the
1965 White Paper, may be placed in the "Yes, there is a convention" camp.
Considering some other works, one of the principal textbooks on Canadian
government by R. MacGregor Dawson3 states emphatically that there is no
convention. The other principal textbook on Canadian government by Professor Mallory of McGill' also states that there is no convention. Mallory and
Dawson are as fine authorities, with respect, as those on the other side. In
Professor Laskin's casebook,5 he studiously avoids saying anything at all
about whether there is or is not a convention. However, I think it is fair to say
that if he had at that time thought that there was a convention, he would
have included statements to that effect in a book on constitutional law.
The conclusion I reached at the time of my survey three years ago was that
the most that could be said was this: it is possible that the practice of securing
provincial consents has hardened into a binding convention. It is possible,
but it is quite unclear. Is that an issue to be decided by the United Kingdom
Parliament? Look at what else is involved. Once the United Kingdom
Parliament has made its decision as to whether or not we do have a
convention in Canada requiring the prior consent of the provinces before a
request for amendment comes forward, they then have to embark upon an
inquiry as to what has happened in Canada. Has the necessary consultation
occurred? Have the required consents been given?
It might be said in the present case that those facts are quite uncontroversial. We do know the attitude of at least most of the provinces. Perhaps we
know the attitude of all the provinces. But in principle, it is simply
objectionable for the British government to take upon itself an inquiry into
the extent of consultation and agreement within Canada before a request for

1. P. Gdrin-Lajoie, ConstitutionalAmendment in Canada (1950).
2. The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, A White Paper of the Government of
Canada (Ottawa, 1965).
3. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th ed. 1970).
4. J. R.Mallory, The Structureof CanadianGovernment (1971).
5. Laskin ' ConstitutionalLaw (4th rev. ed. A.S. Abel ed. 1975).
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amendment goes forward. I appreciate that one can go further, as Professor
Lederman does in his writings, and say not merely that there is a convention
requiring prior provincial consents to an amendment of the constitution
affecting the provinces, but that there is an actual rule of law imposing that
requirement which would make it illegal for the federal Parliament to
request an amendment without those prior consents. Surely the United
Kingdom Parliament should not do anything illegal. But to me it is quite
objectionable for the British government to presume to decide that difficult
question of legality. Only the courts can decide that question - the courts
here in Canada, and ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada. I agree that if
the Supreme Court of Canada were to decide that the request for an
amendment was illegal the United Kingdom Parliament should not comply
with it.
Therefore, I conclude that one option - the simple refusal of the request,
at least before any ruling of illegality has been obtained - is not a proper
choice for the United Kingdom Parliament. I conclude that the United
Kingdom Parliament should not refuse the request. Provided the request has
been made by the Senate and House of Commons in the accustomed way,
provided it is not illegal, then the role of the British Parliament is simply to
act on the request, closing its eyes to whatever events or controversies have
occurred within Canada. That is the "no sniffing at the package" theory.
As I said, one could contemplate a third possibility, the possibility of delay.
In the present situation we do have a complicating factor, and that is the fact
that there is litigation in Canada concerning the legality of the request. I
might say, as an aside, that I do interpret the questions which are being put
to the courts as inviting a ruling on the legality of the request and not merely
whether it is in compliance with convention or not. I do think that the United
Kingdom Parliament is entitled to take notice of the fact that this litigation
is in place. The litigation could bear on the legality of what the British Parliament is about to do, and I have conceded that they do not have to do
anything that is illegal. I am inclined to believe that it is a proper course for
the United Kingdom Parliament to delay its consideration of the request
until a forthright decision has been reached by the courts in Canada as to the
legality of the request. If the courts were to say that the request is legal, then
the United Kingdom Parliament should comply with it immediately.
In other words, the United Kingdom Parliament should not be deterred by
expressions of disapproval by the courts, or even by a statement in the
Supreme Court of Canada, if it should occur, that what has happened is in
breach of a convention. The Supreme Court of Canada would not be so
unwise, in my view, as to make expressions of opinion as to the propriety of
what has happened, or even as to whether a convention has been breached. I
do not think the courts will give such rulings because that is not their
function. If they were to do so, then in my view the United Kingdom Parliament should pay no attention to those statements by the courts. The thrust of
my argument has been that the United Kingdom Parliament is not bound by
any convention that exists in Canada. Only the federal Parliament within
Canada is bound by it. I conclude, therefore, that the United Kingdom
Parliament could delay the request pending a ruling as to legality by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
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W. R. LEDERMAN*

What has been said by Dr. Marshall and by Professor Hogg brings to mind
a quotation from someone who has been mentioned here - Professor James
Mallory of McGill. If I can recall it correctly, the substance of it was something like this: "In the United States, if something is unconstitutional it is
illegal, even though it may be something desirable. In Britain, if something is
unconstitutional it is wrong, even though it may be legal." That points up the
dilemma which is confronting us. I want to comment primarily on two things
that are related both to what has been said and to the topic: firstly, the
position of the Supreme Court of Canada, and secondly, the position of the
British government and Parliament and the Kershaw Report.
I sense considerable agreement on the panel in favour of turning to the
Supreme Court of Canada. I would like to point out what may be a rather
obvious thing, although perhaps it has not really been put this way before.
The final judicial authority for Canada on all subjects and in all respects has
been fully patriated. It resides at the moment inthe hands of the Supreme
Court of Canada as presently constituted. Because of section 7 of the Statute
of Westminster and everything that stands behind it and accounts for it,
there are uncertainties about what the government and Parliament of
Canada can do on its own in the field of amendment. As well there are uncertainties about what the government and legislature of each province can do
in amending the basics of the federal union on their own motion. There are
uncertainties about what kind of a combination of these authorities is
required. But there is no uncertainty about the final authority of the
Supreme Court of Canada. There is no other judicial authority. Thanks to the
Privy Council Appeals case' in 1947 and the amendments of the Supreme
Court Act in 1949, the final judicial authority on all subjects and all matters
for Canada is the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada is in a unique position and a very powerful
position on that account. And to some extent, of course, the Courts of Appeal
of the provinces, indeed all of the superior courts in the country, are in the
same position. We have a unified judicial system. We have a federal country,
but because of the separation of powers in favour of the independence of the
judiciary we are able to operate and we do operate (by virtue of the original
provision of the British North America Act) a unified judicial system, unified
on all subjects. The superior courts, including the provincial Courts of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, try all kinds of legal issues arising
under federal statutes, provincial statutes, or a mixture of the two. And I
suggest that so far as federal constitutional issues are concerned, issues
touching the essentials of the Canadian federal union, no provincial
legislature can by statute deprive the courts of this final power - the power
to decide the basic federal constitutional issues as they arise. No provincial
legislature can block them from doing this, and neither can the Parliament of
Canada.
A further point that concerns us is the status of the convention. If you concede that there is some kind of a convention, and that there must be the consent of most or all of the provinces when the government and Parliament of
*
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Canada propose basic constitutional change affecting the basics of the
federal union, there remains the problem that my two predecessors on the
panel have raised. Is this a convention that is politically and morally
obligatory only and not a matter of law, or has it hardened into a matter of
law? Again, on the matter of the position of the Supreme Court of Canada, I
would point out that the Supreme Court of Canada has the last word on that
issue. Issues of this kind ought to go to the Supreme Court of Canada. As far
as constitutional customs, conventions, principles, practices, and precedents
are concerned, the Supreme Court of Canada has the last word on which of
these, if any, are obligatory in the sense that they are part of the
constitutional law. I would not presume to attempt to predict what the
Supreme Court of Canada is going to say on these issues. But I do say that
they have the last word on these issues as a matter of the constitutional law
of Canada and, further, of the constitutional law of the Commonwealth.
Again this is because judicial power is fully patriated, as it has been since
1949.
Incidentally, in this connection the draftsmen of the federal proposals (the
Canada Act 1981) have amended section 52 and subsection 52(1). The
amendment includes the addition of a supremacy clause to the effect that the
constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is to the extent of the
inconsistency of no force or effect. There had been a supremacy clause for the
Charter (section 25), but no general clause for the whole constitution. Now,
quite properly, they are proposing that there should be a supremacy clause
for the whole constitution. This supremacy clause depends on, and points to,
final authority of the Supreme Court of Canada. A supremacy clause means
that the last word on these issues is placed in the hands of the final court, in
our case, the Supreme Court of Canada. And, further, I would say that
section 52 is not original, but is declaratory of the present situation.
As far as the position of the British government and Parliament are concerned, I have read with great care the Kershaw Report. It is an absolutely
first rate piece of work. It is a remarkable analysis of the problems that
necessarily confront the British government and Parliament. Suggestions
that the British government and Parliament do not have to concern
themselves with the substance of their position are distressing. I believe the
proper analysis of their position to be that they are in the position of trustees.
They are trustees of the amending power for the whole of federal Canada on
basic federal union matters. We put them in that position by asking for
section 7 of the Statute of Westminster and by virtue of a federallprovincial
conference in which every province agreed with the federal government and
Parliament that this was to be so. It makes sense to say that the transfer of
the paramountcy of the British Parliament to the overseas parliaments of
the Dominions was modified, in the case of Canada, to ensure that the
Parliament of Canada could not on its own motion amend the division of
powers and other basics of the federal system. It makes no sense to say that
section 7 was put in to make sure that that did not happen, and then to say on
the other hand that both before and after 1931 the Westminster Parliament
had to give the Canadian Parliament exactly what was asked and could not
"open up the package".
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I am diametrically opposed to the position my learned friend Peter Hogg is
taking. The British government and Parliament do have to look at their position. It is humiliating for us and obviously most embarrassing for the United
Kingdom government and Parliament for us to go to London in this state of
local disarray in Canada. We are being most unfair to the British. We ought
to draw back, and we should not send anything to London until it is
sufficiently agreed upon in Canada, so that it will be proper for them to
respond positively to what the Canadian government and Parliament are
requesting. And requesting, I would say, with the consent of nearly all if not
all of the provinces.
There are two ways of proceeding in order to accomplish this result. One is
the political route of reopening federal-provincial negotiations. The
government of Canada should draw back and reopen federal-provincial negotiations and summon the First Ministers' Conference again. That would have
the added advantage of giving the western provinces a very real voice in
what is going on. They would be speaking once again, through their elected
provincial premiers, to what is happening in the realm of constitutional
change.
The final point is Professor Hogg's point about delay. I hope I have
strengthened the notion that there ought to be delay, at least until the
Supreme Court of Canada has spoken. I would not presume to attempt to predict what that Court will say, but as a matter of constitutional due process I
do accept the authority of the final court.

